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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (6 Feb 70) FOR OT UT 694166

10 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 214th Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

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214th Aviation Battalion

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 214TH AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT)
APO San Francisco 96357

AVCC-E

14 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (214th Aviation
Battalion (Combat) Period ending 31 Oct 69 RCS
CMFOR-65 (R2) (U)

L. USARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT APO 96588 (2 copies)
Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC (DST), APO 96375 (3 copies)
Commanding General, 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: AVGA-G, APO 96384 (2 copies)
Commanding Officer, 164th AG(C), APO 96215 (5 copies)

1. (C) Section 1. Significant Unit Activities:

a. (C) Mission: There were no changes or additions to the Unit Mission during this reporting period.

b. (C) Organization:

(1) There were no changes to the TOE of the Unit during this reporting period.

(2) UP of General Order 34 HQS 164th Avn Gp (Cbt) dtd 17 Aug 69 the 162nd Avn Co (Aslt Hel) and the 191st Avn Co (Aslt Hel) was reassigned to the 13th Avn Bn and the 147th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel) was reassigned to the 307th Avn Bn (Cbt). The 214th Avn Bn (Cbt) gained the 199th Reconnaissance Airplane Co from the 307th Avn Bn and gained the 114th Avn Co (Aslt Hel) and 175th Avn Co (Aslt Hel) from the 13th Avn Bn. UP General Order 3075, HQS USARV, dtd 11 Aug 69 Detachment 11, 5th Weather Squadron was attached (eff 5 Aug 69) to the 214th Avn Bn (Cbt) for administrative, logistic and communication support. (See Incl #1).

c. (C) Personnel Changes and Status:

(1) Commanding Officer - LTC Larry J. Baughman, IN, 572-24-8141, replaced LTC Ronald Stevens, FA, 150-26-2757, on 4 Oct 69.

(2) Executive Officer - MAJ William A. Beasley, FA, 467-52-6582, (no change).

(3) S-1 CPT Gregory Petrakis, AGC, 125-26-7963, (no change).

FCR OT .17

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(4) S-2 1LT Raymond Medlin, IN, 037-28-2619, replaced CPT Larry V. Eads, FA, 444-40-0932, on 1 Oct 69.

(5) S-3 M.J. Bobby R. Adams, IN, 254-58-6172, replaced M.J. Gary P. Bergeron, AR, 043-26-8298, on 1 Sep 69.

(6) S-4 CPT George M. Edwards, FA, 225-56-2218, replaced M.J. John F. Gallup, TC, 044-24-0967, on 4 Aug 69.

d. (c) Unit Strength as of 31 October 1969:

(1) The authorized strength of the 214th Avn Bn (Cbt) is 127 officers, 209 warrant officers, and 1054 enlisted men, for a total authorized strength of 1390. A critical shortage continues to exist in the warrant officer aviator area. It is now considered more acute than it was three months ago. The battalion is authorized:

(2) Military:

	<u>OFF</u>		<u>WO</u>		<u>EM</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>	
	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>
HHC	19	23	3	5	99	106	115	133
114th	19	19	51	43	218	209	288	271
*135th	19	17	51	46	218	233	288	296
175th	19	24	51	37	218	228	288	289
199th	32	23	2	6	89	84	123	113
335th	19	19	51	41	218	201	288	261
**758th	2	1	0	0	8	3	10	4
**5th WX Det	1	1	0	0	8	7	9	8

* Includes 35 Australian EM and 11 OFF
** Attached Units

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(3) Civilian: The 214th Avn Bn (Cbt) is under the freeze imposed by USARV on the hiring of Direct Hire and Program 6 personnel. With the departure of the 9th Division and the relocation to Vinh Long, this battalion should be able to fill its direct hire allocations in the near future.

<u>DiC</u>		<u>VN</u>		<u>3 Nat'l</u>		<u>Contractor</u>		
<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>
HHC	0	0	13	13	0	0	0	0
135th	0	0	11	7	0	0	0	0
335th	0	0	8	8	0	0	0	0
114th	0	0	6	7	0	0	0	0
175th	0	0	6	4	0	0	0	0
199th	0	0	3	3	0	0	0	0
758th	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0

e. (c) Administration:

(1) Casualties in the 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat)

<u>HOSTILE</u>		<u>NON-HOSTILE</u>	
Lightly Wounded	21	Lightly Wounded	20
VSI	1	VSI	0
KIA	0	KIA	0
MIA	0		

(2) During this period the battalion had 34 emergency leaves and 1 compassionate leave.

(3) 265 EM were promoted: 164 to E4, 95 to E5, and 6 to E6.

f. (c) Intelligence: Security - A total of eight hundred and nineteen (819) classified documents were processed by the S-2 Section during the reporting period, of which eight hundred and nine (809) were confidential and thirteen (13) were secret.

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g. (c) Operations and Training:

(1) HHC, and the 199th Aviation Company (Utility Airplane) were operational for 92 days of the reporting period. The remaining companies of the battalion were operational as follows:

(a) 135th AC(AH) - 79 days. Thirteen maintenance stand-down days during the period.

(b) 114th AC(AH) - 89 days. Three maintenance stand-down days during the period.

(c) 335th AC(AH) - 79 days. Thirteen maintenance stand-down days during the period.

(d) 175th AC(AH) - 89 days. Three maintenance stand-down days during the period.

(2) Operations:

(a) The 114th and 175th Aviation Companies (Aslt Hel) have provided support for the 9th ARVN Division and units located through-out the 44th Special Tactical Zone. These companies alternate missions on two week basis. The 9th ARVN Division requirement is a KBR package consisting of five slicks, one C&C, and one light fire team. The 44th Special Tactical Zone requirement is two Mi ht Hunter Killer teams. The team that supports the Moc Hoa area consist of one C&C, one slick, one flare ship and one light fire team. The team that uses Chi Lang as a base camp consists of one C&C, one flare ship, and one light fire team. The 114th Aviation Company (Aslt Hel) and the 175th Aviation Company (Aslt Hel) also provide five swing ships on a daily basis for general support and training missions.

(b) The 135th Aviation Company (Aslt Hel) located at Camp Martin Cox (Bearcat), supports the 7th ARVN Division exclusively. The daily package consists of one C&C, eight slicks, and one heavy fire team. An additional three slicks are flagged out daily for Sector or Province general support missions. The 135th Aviation Company (Aslt Hel) normally receives one maintenance stand-down per week depending on the tactical situation in the area of operations.

(c) The 335th Aviation Company (Aslt Hel) located at Camp Martin Cox (Bearcat), supports the 7th ARVN Division and provides supplemental support to the 9th ARVN Division due to the limited operational capabilities of VNAF. The daily package consist of one C&C, eight slicks, and one heavy fire team. An additional three slicks are allocated for Sector and Province general support missions. The 335th Aviation Company (Aslt Hel) normally receives one maintenance

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5. JOC: Operational Report - Lessons Learned

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stand-down per week depending on the tactical situation in the area of operations.

(d) The 139th Aviation Company (Utility Airplane) provides aviation support for the 7th ARVN Division, 9th ARVN Division, and 44th Special Tactical Zone. The daily commitment, of twenty-five aircraft, is utilized for visual recon, artillery adjustment, air boat control, and Com and Liaison missions.

(3) Training: With the departure of the 9th Infantry Division and the relocation of this battalion to Vinh Long, new replacement personnel no longer receive a five day Vietnam Orientation Course which was operated by the 9th Division Old Reliable Academy. Through direct coordination with engineer organizations located at this installation an arms qualification range has been constructed. It is noted that this range is limited to small arms and semi-automatic weapons.

h. (C) Logistics:

(1) This battalion was relocated from Dong Tam to Vinh Long on the 21st of August. The 191st Aviation Company (Aslt Hel) of the 132nd Aviation Company (Aslt Hel) previously assigned to the 214th were reassigned to the 13th Aviation Battalion (Cbt). The 147th Aviation Company (ASH) was also reassigned to the 307th Aviation Battalion. Three units in Vinh Long, the 114th and 175th Aviation Companies (Aslt Hel) and the 199th Aviation Company (UA) replaced the previous units. There have been three Direct Support Units for automotive maintenance at Vinh Long since 21 August 1969. The 238th Maintenance Detachment was evacuated to COMUS. The 536th Maintenance Detachment replaced the 238th on 5 September 1969. Insufficient working space caused a delay in the operational setup of the 536th Detachment which delayed submission of requisitions and job orders by the units being supported. On 19 September 1969 the units started submitting requisitions to the DSU. The 536th Maintenance Detachment was redesignated the 51st Maintenance Detachment on 22 October 1969.

(2) During this quarter approximately 50% of the personnel on flight status in the 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat) have been issued SPH-4 helmets. These helmets have ballistic and sound suppressing properties.

(3) On 5 September 1969, the 214th assumed the responsibilities of refueling all aircraft at Vinh Long Airfield. Assigned units furnished personnel and vehicles to accomplish this mission, under the supervision of the Battalion S-4. Prior to this battalion's arrival in Vinh Long, aircraft refueling was the responsibility of the 7/1 CAV. Four 1200 gallon tank trucks were transferred from

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the 7/1st to units of the 214th Aviation Battalion (Cbt) to alleviate some of the shortages that existed. All of the tank trucks are M49C models which are old and are a maintenance problem. The Mini-Port is located on the edge of a swampy area. During the monsoon season some erosion is experienced requiring the area to be rebuilt during the dry season.

(4) Aircraft revetments located on the north-west portion of Ramp # 1 are a safety hazard. There are six revetments located approximately midway on the ramp that protrude into the hover lane narrowing it to 82 feet. Five revetments located at the west end of the hover lane reduce the width to 76 feet. A project is presently in the planning stages to widen and extend all of Ramp # 1.

(5) The 214th Aviation Battalion (Cbt) assumed responsibility for the consolidated mess at Vinh Long. Approximately 950 military and civilian personnel are fed at each meal. The mess is considered inadequate for the number of personnel fed. Meal hours have been extended as an expedient means of resolving the problem.

1. (c) Aircraft Maintenance:**(1) Aircraft assigned as of 31 October 1969:**

UNIT	<u>UH-1B</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>UH-1D</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>AH-1G</u>	<u>O-1</u>	<u>OH-6A</u>	<u>U64</u>	Auth	OH								
HHC	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	
114th	0	0	8	0	0	13	23	8	6	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
135th	0	0	8	0	0	0	23	19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
175th	0	0	8	7	0	18	23	2	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
335th	8	7	8	0	0	0	23	19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
199th	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	25	0	0	1	1	1	

(2) Overall Availability of Assigned Aircraft:

	<u>UH-1B</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>UH-1D</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>AH-1G</u>	<u>O-1</u>	<u>U64</u>	<u>OH-6A</u>
Aug	74	66	78	80	82	88	64	0
Sep	75	74	82	81	69	86	84	0
Oct	91	73	79	80	61	87	77	0

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j. (U) Safety:

(1) During the past quarter the battalion flew 34,659 hours, and experienced 9 accidents. The accident rate for the quarter is 25.9 as compared to 12.8 last quarter.

(2) Pilot error was the cause for six of the nine accidents. Material failure caused the remaining three.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>RATE</u>	<u>ACCIDENTS</u>
Aug	11,796	9.1	1
Sep	11,439	26.9	3
Oct	12,626	40.0	5

CUMULATIVE RATE FOR FISCAL YEAR 70 - 23.4

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. (U) Personnel: None

b. (U) Intelligence: None

c. (C) Operations:

(1) Night Hunter Killer Employment:

(a) OBSERVATION - Night Hunter Killer (NHK) Teams produce few results for the number of aircraft committed.

(b) EVALUATION - The Night Hunter killer Team consists of one Command and Control aircraft with light cluster, one light fire team, one flare ship, and three slicks. The original concept was for the NHK to find targets, engage them, and employ the three slicks with a reactionary force. In practice the NHK makes reconnaissance flights which detect very few targets. Most targets engaged are from sensor spottings, ground unit sightings, or the infrequent OV-1 spottings. In three months of flying very few insertions have been made on a target. Insufficient targets are located to justify the commitment of this package.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - Surveillance equipment should be used for a surveillance mission. The use of TPH-18 or similar equipment and OV-1 aircraft would provide more effective surveillance. A radar directed light fire team could provide the firepower. The assault helicopter company should be taken off the mission.

(d) COMMAND ACTION - Unsatisfactory Mission Reports and two staff studies have been submitted to 164th Aviation Group (Combat).

(2) Night Target Attacks:

(a) OBSERVATION - SLAR Radar materially increases fire team effectiveness at night.

(b) EVALUATION - The radar established at two points along the Cambodian border in IV Corp was intended to help prevent border overflights. When coordinates of an enemy location are known this radar can give vectors to the flare ship, which can put flares on the target. The guns should be about one minute behind the flare ship, at attack altitude, so that an attack can begin immediately when flares illuminate the area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - SLAR Radar should be made available in tactical areas which frequently have night operations. Pilots and ground personnel who operate in these areas should be thoroughly briefed in the use of radar.

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(1) COMMAND ACTION: Procedures for the use of SLAR Radar for vector to enemy locations has been implemented and personnel have been briefed on proper procedures to be used.

(2) Improper placement of body armor in AH-1G:

(a) OBSERVATION: On a number of AH-1G's of the 114th Aviation Company (Aslt Hel) the crew chiefs have noted a number of canopies with deep cuts on the inside.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to improper placement of the chest plate after use; it has been noticed that some pilots place the plate between the armor seats and the canopy. The metal strap holders on the plate cause the cuts in the canopy.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The chest plate be stowed in the proper place aboard the AH-1G when not in use.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Aircraft Commanders and Pilots of AH-1G's were instructed to place protective body armor in the aircraft seats when not in use.

(4) Lack of American Advisors:

(a) OBSERVATION: Delays caused by not having American advisors always available in the pick-up zone when operating with ARVN forces.

(b) EVALUATION: When using the same pick-up zone several times during an operation, confusion often arises when there is no American advisor on the ground due to the need for advisors in the landing zone. In addition ground advisors working with different assault helicopter companies must continually adjust their method of operation due to slight differences within the different helicopter companies.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Two (2) Pathfinders be attached to each assault helicopter company. Flying on the lead troop carrier they can be dropped off on the first flight into a pick-up zone and control the line up of the ground troops according to the aviation company's preferred mode of operation. This would further free the advisor for additional final briefings of his ground troops and allow him to accompany the assault troops into the initial lift, greater control is necessary and could be valuably increased by having more advisors present while Pathfinders control the pick-up zone. Extractions would also be significantly enhanced by dropping off Pathfinders prior to the arrival of troop carriers.

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(d) COMMAND ACTION: A minimum of two Pathfinders were attached to each aviation company (aslt hel) to improve pick-up zone and landing zone and loading zone operations.

d. (U) Organization: None

e. (U) Training:

(1) Weapons Qualification:

(a) OBSERVATION: Many enlisted personnel required to man perimeter defense positions are not qualified with weapons employed for this purpose.

(b) EVALUATION: Enlisted personnel that have not attended infantry secondary training have not qualified and are not familiar with the M-60 machine gun and the M-79 grenade launcher. Many installations concerned primarily with aviation operations do not have the facilities to qualify these personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That action be initiated to qualify all personnel with the basic perimeter defense weapons prior to their assignment to units without the necessary facilities.

(d) COMMAND ACTION:

1. Through direct coordination with engineer organizations located at this installation an arms qualification range has been constructed.

2. This unit has initiated a program to qualify all personnel subject to perimeter defense duty with the basic perimeter defense weapons.

f. (C) Logistics:

(1) Mess:

(a) OBSERVATION: The Battalion Consolidated Mess is feeding approximately 950 personnel at each meal being served. In order to provide adequately for this number of personnel it was necessary to extend meal hours.

(b) EVALUATION: The existing dining hall was not capable of handling 950 personnel at each meal. The serving line did not have the facilities for a continuous smooth flow of personnel through the line resulting in numerous slow downs and halts while containers were restocked.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That an additional serving line be established to relieve the burden on existing line. The additional serving line to have the capability of absorbing approximately one half of the personnel being fed.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Additional steam tables were installed and are functioning. The flow of personnel through the serving line is smooth and rapid.

(2) Lack of Adequate Command Communications:

(a) OBSERVATION: The 80 mile separation between battalion headquarters at Vinh Long and two subordinate units at Bearcat places an extreme burden on standard command and control communications circuits, often rendering them unreliable.

(b) EVALUATION: At present, two sole user circuits have been extended from the Battalion Operations Center to the two company operations centers. Since they were installed early in September 1969, the reliability of the circuits has been approximately 50%. Repeated outages were noted and reported to the respective post signal offices at both locations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the two existing circuits either be improved to an acceptable level or withdrawn and totally replaced with more reliable circuits.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Direct coordination was effected with the Vinh Long post signal office and it was learned that the circuits in question would be involved in a future circuit cutover (middle of November 1969). The cutover involves a complete change of unit responsibility for the circuits. Additionally, the newer units employs more up to date associated electronics equipment which will improve the quality of the circuits. It is anticipated that this newer service will resolve the problem.

h. (U) Material: None

i. (U) Safety: Tail Rotor Water Strikes:

(1) OBSERVATION: Over the last quarter there have been recurring instances of tail rotors striking water in inundated LZ's.

(2) EVALUATION: If pilots making approaches into inundated LZ's would slow the approach speed so that a steep flare would not be required and bring the aircraft to a three foot hover prior to setting down, the tail rotor strikes could be avoided.

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(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: Recommend pilots use steeper and slower approach into inundated LZ's and terminate at three foot hover prior to setting down.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: Recommendations in aircraft accident reports have been listed so as to bring about procedural change. A letter has been sent to all subordinate units requiring the above described procedure be used.

1189 1100-7-200-1
2 Incl
1 - Organization
2 - Operational Statistics

LARRY J. BAUGHMAN
LTC, IN
Commanding

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AVBACB (14 Nov 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 214th Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFBn-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ, 164th AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT), APO 96215, 30 November 1969

TO: Department of the Army, ATTN: ACSPUR
Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBAGB-0

1. (U) The attached 214th CAB Order for the period ending 31 October 1969 has been reviewed by this headquarters.

2. (U) The following correction is made to the report:

a. Para 1 h (1), page 5: 199th Aviation Company (U.S.) should read 199th Aviation Company (ARV).

b. Incl 1: The 758th Medical Detachment is assigned rather than attached.

3. (C) The following comments are made on the report:

a. (C) Para 1 h (4), page 6: Concur with revetment observations. An 83 foot strip behind these revetments has been cleared by the 36th Engineer Battalion. This cleared area is designed to permit modification of those revetments located at the narrowest portion of the hoverlane and thereby increase the clearance width. This course of action is a temporary solution pending the approval of this operational support project being presently prepared by HQs, 214th CAB.

b. (C) Para 2 c (1), page 8: This headquarters concurs in part with this observation. The Night Hunter/Killer tactics currently used are, at best, only marginally effective. The concept proposed in the recommendation is the same as used on operation Night Phantom III which was initiated during the month of September 1969. Night Phantom III utilizes one OV-10A aircraft, one UH-1H CAC aircraft and two AH-1G Cobras as its air assets. A TIN 18 radar is used for ground control. The operation was first employed in the Tram area located in northwestern Kien Giang Province and western Chau Doc Province. The OV-10A ship flies over the area and senses moving targets. The inflight read out from the ship is transmitted to the ground radar site where an officer from the OV-10 company plots the information on the radar scope and determines target priorities in the event there are multiple targets. Data link process is also used with a ground station at Can Tho to get a more precise read out. This information is then relayed back to the OV-10 which in turn relays it to the ground radar site. Once a target has been plotted, the CAC ship and light fire team are launched from their strip alert status (located near the ground radar) and are vectored to the target area by radar controllers. The CAC aircraft obtains clearance to fire from the appropriate agency while enroute. The CAC is equipped with flares and drops them upon instruction from the controller. The gunships are

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are then vectored into the area of the target and engage the target visually using the illumination of the flare. Flechette or 17 lb VT rockets are used to engage the target. Another Night Phantom III operation was started in the U-Minh Forest, An Kuyen Province on 31 October 1969 using the same concept. Results, at this time, indicate that the Night Phantom III serves as a positive deterrent to enemy movement. The success of this concept depends upon the availability of specified strike zones, the absence of friendly population in the area of operations, and an expeditious means of receiving permission to fire. A TRN 18 radar is presently located at Moc Hoa with the primary mission of preventing border overflight. This headquarters is coordinating with the 165th Aviation Group on establishing a TRN 18 radar site at Chau Coc. With the installation of this radar, the entire border will have radar coverage; therefore, the Night Phantom can be employed in the area where the Night Hunter Killer Teams are presently conducting visual night surveillance. This area (northern Kien Tuong Province, northern Kien Kien Phong Province, and north eastern Chau Doc Province) has a greater population density and fewer specified strike zones than does the Tram and U-Minh Forest. Within the Tram and U-Minh practically all targets sensed can be engaged with a short reaction time. However, in the more densely populated area of operations recommended by the 214th CAB, clearance to fire will be more difficult to obtain and the strike zones more restricted. The proposal is currently being studied by IV Corps and the Province officials concerned. The whole question of night surveillance of the border is being restudied and the 164th CAB is now assisting the 214th in the construction of a kit containing a xenon searchlight, night observation device, and minigun. This should offer better surveillance and a more economical target destruction capability.

c. (C) Para 2 c (2) (b), page 8: The TRN 18 radar at Moc Hoa was installed primarily to prevent border overflights; however, the radar located at the Cement Plant, VS 596356, was established primarily to be used as ground control for vectoring aircraft on operation Night Phantom III.

- d. (C) Para 2 c (2), (c), page 8: Concur.
- e. (U) Para 2 c (3), (c), page 9: Concur.
- f. (u) Para 2 d (4), (c), page 9: Concur.
- g. (U) Para 2 e (1), (c), page 10: Concur.
- h. (U) Para 2 f (1), (c), page 11: This observation pertains to this battalion only and does not constitute a valid lesson learned.
- i. (C) Para 2 f (2), (c), page 11: Concur.
- j. (U) Para 2 i (3), page 12: Concur. This observation was included in 164th Aviation Group (Combat) OMLL.

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(Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

J. M. Tumlinson
J. M. TUMLINSON
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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AVBAGC-0 (14 Nov 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 214th Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384

8 DEC 1969

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVAGC-DST,
APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the contents as indorsed.
2. The following additional comment is considered pertinent: paragraph 2c(3), page 9, discusses damage to AH-1G canopies as a result of improperly storing crewmember armor protective chest plates between the crew seat and aircraft canopy. Concur with the recommendation and command action to store chest plates in crew seats when not in use. This information has been disseminated to subordinate units of the 1st Aviation Brigade.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



ARTHUR W. LITTLE
CPT AGC
Asst AGC

Cy of 2d Ind Furn,
CO 214th Avn Bn (Cbt)

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AVHGC-DST (14 Nov 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (214th Aviation Battalion (Combat) Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 1 JAN 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat) and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning "Aircraft Revetments", page 6, paragraph 1h(4), and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3a: Concur with the interim action taken as indicated in the 1st Indorsement. The recommended width of hover lanes for UH-1 series aircraft is 120 feet as specified in HQ, USARV letter, AVHAV-OPT, 6 Aug 69, Subject: Aircraft Revetments.

b. (C) Reference item concerning "Lack of American Advisors", page 9, paragraph 2c(4); nonconcur. Pathfinders are organic at aviation battalion level to provide flexibility of employment necessary to accomplish the mission. While the unit has chosen to employ them in the manner indicated, this employment may be unsatisfactory for all units, therefore, pathfinder employment should remain a matter covered by SOP.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L. D. Murray
L. D. MURRAY
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy Furn:
214th Avn Bn
1st Avn Bde

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GPOP-DT (14 Nov 69) 4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 214th Aviation Battalion (Combat)
for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 19 JAN 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310


This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. Shultz
C. L. Shultz
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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Enclosure 14c) Organizational Chart and troop list to 214th AB(C) Operational Report
Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969.



Incl 1

*These companies were assigned to the 13th AB(C) until 1 Sept 69 when they were reassigned to the 214th AB (C).

**Attached Units.

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ENCLOSURE # 2 - OPERATIONAL STATISTICS (C)

	AMC	114th	125th	172nd	395th	199th
1. Number of hrs flown	535	5904	8525	7192	8416	6156
2. Number of M/R slicks daily	0	77%	80%	83%	83.5%	N/A
3. Number of M/R guns daily	0	56%	78%	72%	77%	N/A
4. Aircraft hit by hostile fire	0	13	78	15	44	2
5. Estimated number of rounds	0	32	94	18	100	7
6. KIA - Hostile fire	0	0	0	0	0	0
7. KIA - Non-Hostile fire	0	0	0	0	0	0
8. VC KIA confirmed	0	169	41	182	107	313
9. VC structures destroyed	0	107	48	260	348	219
10. VC sampans destroyed	0	136	27	372	50	247
11. Sorties flown	920	12415	26295	12082	31836	6935
12. Cargo handled (tons)	3	146	227	183	354	N/A
13. Paxs carried	1238	20724	74273	22130	83740	450
14. A/C Dest - Hostile Fire	0	1	0	0	0	0
15. A/C Dest - Non-Hostile	0	4	3	0	1	0

Incl 2

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